Can thiệp và đối kháng

Chính quyền Joe Biden tiếp tục chủ trương cứng rắn với Trung Quốc (TQ) ở Biển Đông và hối thúc đồng minh can dự. Tháng 1/2021, một chiến hạm Canada đi qua eo biển Đài Loan để tới điểm tập trận chung ở Biển Đông cùng Australia, Nhật Bản và Mỹ. Ngày 9/2/2021, hai nhóm tàu sân bay Mỹ USS Theodore Roosevelt và USS Nimitz có cuộc tập trận chung ở Biển Đông. Tháng 2/2021, Hải quân Pháp điều tàu ngầm tấn công SNA Emeraude có tàu BSAM Seine hỗ trợ đến tuần tra ở Biển Đông, điều tàu đổ bộ tấn công Tonnerre và tàu khi trục Surcouf từ cảng Toulon tới biển Đông thực hiện nhiệm vụ tuần tra và huấn luyện 3 tháng. Cùng tháng 2/2021, tàu sân bay HMS Queen Elizabeth hiện đại nhất của Anh cùng chiến đấu cơ thế hệ 5 tàng hình F-3 và các máy bay trực thăng đã rời cảng Portsmouth tới Biển Đông, được hộ tống bởi 4 tàu khu trục, 1 tàu ngầm hạt nhân, 2 tàu tiếp liệu và tiếp tế. Ngày 5/4/2021, các tàu chiến Mỹ, Nhật, Australia, Ấn Độ và Pháp tham gia tập trận hải quân La Perouse kéo dài 3 ngày ở vịnh Bengal.

Hình thức “Bộ tứ +” có thể mở rộng với sự tham gia của các thành viên khác. Đức, Anh sẽ gửi tàu chiến đến Biển Đông cuối năm 2021. Pháp, Đức, Hà Lan đang soạn thảo chiến lược Ấn – Thái của EU. Tàu hộ tống lớp Bayern của Đức sẽ tới châu Á và đi qua Biển Đông vào tháng 12, đánh dấu lần đầu tiên tàu chiến Đức tới đây từ năm 2002.
Đồng thuận Washington về sự can thiệp quân sự ở Biển Đông của Mỹ cùng đồng minh, đối tác và phản ứng đối kháng, quyết đoán không khoan nhượng của Bắc Kinh sẽ làm gia tăng nguy cơ đụng độ quân sự với những hậu quả khó lường nhất là khi Bắc Kinh đã thông qua Luật hải cảnh mới cho phép nổ súng trước.

Nguy cơ và ứng phó

Thời gian tới, ngoài các phiên bản đụng độ mà TQ chủ động gây ra như các trường hợp EP-3E, Impeccable, USS Cowpens và Decatur… sẽ có thể xảy ra thêm một số kiểu đụng độ khác sau:
Một là, TQ có thể thiết lập Vùng nhận diện phòng không (ADIZ) ở Biển Đông và dùng máy bay xua đuổi các máy bay của đối phương có thể dẫn tới va chạm trên không.
Hai là, trường hợp Ba Đầu cho thấy Khả năng Bắc Kinh có thể dùng “biển thuyền” dân sự để ngăn chặn tàu chiến của đối phương và gây va chạm trên biển để tạo cớ gây hấn.
Ba là, Bắc Kinh có thể sử dụng một số vũ khí trí tuệ nhân tạo như máy bay không người lái, thủy lôi thông minh và tàu ngầm mini không người lái để cản phá.

Trong trường hợp xấu nhất do đánh giá sai ý đồ của nhau và không kiểm soát được hành vi, va chạm quân sự có thể bùng phát thành xung đột hoặc chiến tranh cục bộ nhất là khi một số vũ khí trí tuệ nhân tạo được kích hoạt. Kết hợp sự hung hăng của TQ và sự dao động của Mỹ khiến khu vực có thể rơi vào hỗn loạn. Ấn Độ Dương – Thái Bình Dương hiện nay giống như châu Âu trước chiến tranh – mất cân bằng, trật tự rạn nứt và không có liên minh rõ ràng để giải quyết vấn đề.

Do đó, cần đặt việc giải quyết vấn đề va chạm quân sự ở Biển Đông trong khuôn khổ cấu trúc an ninh khu vực đang định hình. Ba bài học châu Âu trước đây Mỹ có thể áp dụng:  (I) Thiết lập sự cân bằng quyền lực ở khu vực; (II) Kiến tạo một trật tự mà các quốc gia trong khu vực công nhận là chính đáng; (III) Xây dựng liên minh giữa các đồng minh và đối tác để giải quyết thách thức mà TQ đặt ra cho cả hai bên./.

TS Nguyễn Đình Luân

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By Ryan Martinson

A Chinese fishing vessel appears in a sensitive location—near the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, a South China Sea reef, or just offshore from a U.S. military base. Is it an “ordinary” fishing boat, or is it maritime militia?

This straightforward question seldom yields straightforward answers. China does not publish a roster of maritime militia boats. That would undermine the militia’s key advantages—secrecy and deniability. Nor is it common for Chinese sources to recognize the militia affiliations of individual boats. Analysts can gather clues and make a case that a vessel is likely maritime militia, or not. That process requires painstaking effort, and the results are rarely definitive.

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) may have made that process much easier, at least in the most contested parts of the South China Sea—the Spratly Islands. Since 2014, the PRC has built hundreds of large Spratly fishing vessels, collectively called the “Spratly backbone fleet” (南沙骨干船队). As I recently suggested at War on the Rocks, most if not all of these vessels are maritime militia affiliated. This insight can help overcome the perennial challenge of differentiating wayward Chinese fishermen from covert elements of China’s armed forces.

Backbone Boats are Militia Boats

In late 2012, PRC leaders decided to invest heavily in the modernization of China’s marine fishing fleet. Prompted by a proposal made by 27 scholars at the Chinese Academy of Engineering, they implemented a series of policies to help fishing boat owners replace their small, old wooden vessels with larger, steel-hulled craft. These programs provided subsidies to large segments of the Chinese fishing industry. But the most generous support was reserved for a specific class of fisherman: i.e., those licensed to operate in the “Spratly waters,” the 820,000 square kilometers of Chinese-claimed land and sea south of 12 degrees latitude.

The Chinese government, both at the central and local levels, allocated large sums of money to reimburse fishing boat owners willing to build new Spratly boats. Hundreds of Chinese fishing boat owners took them up on this offer. The new boats constituted the “Spratly backbone fleet.”

The PRC was very particular about what kinds of boats it wanted in the new fleet. In a January 2018 interview, the Party Secretary of a Guangxi-based firm named Qiaogang Jianhua Fisheries Company (桥港镇建华渔业公司) acknowledged that while the subsidies were quite large, the new boats had to meet very exacting standards. According to the Secretary, surnamed Zhong, the vessels must be quite large, have powerful engines, and be equipped with advanced refrigeration units, among “many, many” other stipulations. Zhong declared, “The document listing these requirements (批文) is very thick. If you don’t adhere to these stipulations, then there’s no subsidy.”

Aside from controlling what types of boats got built, Beijing likely desired some control over how the new boats got used. If deployed effectively, their actions could, like at Scarborough Shoal in 2012, enable new territorial acquisitions. Conversely, if misused, they could damage China’s reputation and even precipitate a violent clash. When the program began, China already had in place a system for controlling the activities of its fishing boats in contested waters: the maritime militia.

The “maritime militia” (海上民兵) is the saltwater element of China’s national militia. Like the People’s Armed Police and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), it is a component of the country’s armed forces. Most members of the maritime militia have day jobs, often as fishermen. However, their affiliation with the militia means that their vessels can be “requisitioned” (征用) to participate in training activities and conduct missions (service for which they are compensated). Militia members are trained and managed by PLA officers assigned to People’s Armed Forces Departments (PAFDs) in the city, county, or town in which the militiamen reside.

Subsidies for construction of the Spratly backbone fleet have been channeled both to existing members of the maritime militia and unaffiliated fishing boat owners that were willing to take the oath as a condition for the money. Among the first to receive the new boats, members of the Tanmen maritime militia benefited from the first approach. Spratly backbone boats registered to Hainan’s Yangpu Economic Development Zone offer an example of the second.

The Spratly backbone fleet appears to be managed by the coordinated efforts of provincial fisheries authorities and the provincial military system (of which PAFDs are a part). The most compelling support for this thesis comes from a 2017 report by the Guangzhou-based MP Consulting Group, which was hired to audit Guangdong’s Marine and Fisheries Bureau. The resulting 96-page document was subsequently posted on the website of the Guangdong Department of Finance.

In their report, MP consultants assessed the Bureau’s success at achieving the seven goals established for 2016. Most were domestic regulatory functions, irrelevant to this story. However, the Bureau’s seventh goal set out the organization’s mission to help protect China’s “rights” in disputed maritime space in the South China Sea. MP consultants generally gave favorable marks on this account, listing eight noteworthy achievements. These included the Bureau’s role in “promoting the construction of maritime militia forces.” Specifically, the Bureau spent 2016 clarifying the division of responsibilities between it and the provincial military district with respect to the “construction, daily operation, combat readiness training, and other relevant tasks” of the Spratly backbone fleet. This statement indicates that the Guangdong elements of the Spratly backbone fleet—and, by extension, those backbone vessels based in Guangxi and Hainan provinces—are organized into militia units jointly managed by the provincial military district and the provincial Marine and Fisheries Bureau.

Other evidence supports the hypothesis that “backbone” boats are militia boats. In August 2020, for instance, the Jiangmen City branch of the Bank of Guangzhou released a summary of its contributions to the local economy. Among these, the branch cited a 97 million RMB loan it provided to an unnamed “top tier fishing company” to build 11 Spratly backbone boats. The bank unwittingly revealed that these new fishing vessels also had “militia functions” (民兵用船功能).

A generic employment contract for crew members embarking on Spratly backbone boats offers additional evidence. The contract—which was uploaded to a Baidu document sharing platform in February 2019—outlines terms for employment at the Shanwei City Cheng District Haibao Fisheries Professional Cooperative (汕尾市城区海宝渔业专业合作社). While little is known about this cooperative, its members are clearly active in the Spratlys. Indeed, its operations manager, Mr. Zhang Jiancheng (张建成), serves as the General Secretary of the Shanwei Spratly Fishing Association (汕尾市南沙捕捞协会).

The Haibao Fisheries contract makes clear that its backbone boats are militia boats, without actually using the words “maritime militia.” It contains a section on “rights protection requisitioning” (维权征用), i.e., removing the boat from production so that it can serve state functions in disputed maritime space. According to Article 2 in that section, if required for “national defense,” the fishing vessel and its crew must “participate in training activities and rights protection tasks, and support military operations.” Article 2 also indicates that crew members must comply with arrangements made by the fishing cooperative and “obey the command of the military” and other government authorities. Article 4 states that if and when the fishing vessel is requisitioned, the boat and its crew must “obey the command of the state,” operating in the manner required, mooring in the determined location, and “completing the operational tasks according to the specific requirements.”

Section 6 outlines the rules governing crew behavior, both ashore and at sea. For example, crew members must not gamble, solicit prostitutes, or visit strip clubs while in port (Article 6). The rules also include content specific to the vessel’s militia functions. Article 7 proscribes taking photos and “divulging the secrets of the boat.” Without the permission of the captain, crew members cannot bring outsiders aboard the boat to view its “design structure and internal setup” (设计构造和内部设置).

Implications

In this article, I have argued that most if not all Spratly backbone boats are militia boats. They may actually catch fish, but their militia affiliation makes them available for state and military tasking. If this conclusion is correct, it offers useful new ways to identify Chinese maritime militia forces operating in the Spratly waters. While the PRC does not publish lists of active maritime militia boats, it does share information about which boats belong to the Spratly backbone fishing fleet. This can serve as an indicator of militia status.

How might this work in practice? At the time of this writing, a team of four Chinese fishing boats is operating illegally within 200 nautical miles of Vietnam’s coast, i.e., within the country’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The four vessels are named Qionglinyu 60017, 60018, 60019, and 60020, respectively, indicating they are registered to Hainan’s Lingao county (临高县). Vietnamese maritime law enforcement authorities could evict them, but before doing so they might ask, are they maritime militia?

My answer: “very likely.” A quick sifting of open-source materials reveals they are all backbone boats. This information appears in a March 2020 open letter posted on the website “Message Board for Leaders” (领导留言板). In it, the boat owners entreat PRC officials to restore fuel subsidies and other rewards for operating in “specially-designated waters” in 2018. Likely amounting to hundreds of thousands of RMB, the subsidies were withheld as punishment for operating in the Spratlys without the required licenses. To elicit special consideration, they emphasized that their four vessels were Spratly backbone boats. (Their ploy ultimately failed, as the Lingao County Bureau of Agriculture responded to their letter with a firm but polite refusal to change their decision.)

Southeast Asian countries can and should compile lists of known Spratly backbone boats. They can start with local newspapers, which are a great source for such information. In December 2016, for example, Zhanjiang Daily published an article about the launching of the city’s first Spratly backbone trawlers: the 48-meter (577 ton) Yuemayu 60222 and 60333. Registered to the city’s Mazhang District, the craft are owned by Zhanjiang Xixiang Fisheries (湛江喜翔渔业有限公司). With these clues in hand, one can then try to learn the identities of the company’s two other Spratly backbone boats, then still under construction.

The websites of Chinese shipbuilding companies are another useful source of information. Those with contracts to build backbone boats often issue news releases when these vessels are launched or delivered. In October 2017, for instance, the Fujian-based Lixin Ship Engineering Company launched five very large Spratly backbone trawlers built for a Guangdong fishing company, Maoming City Desheng Fisheries Limited. The five boats were delivered two months later. They included Yuedianyu 42881, 42882, 42883, 42885, and 42886. The boats were 63.6 meters in length and had the large (1244kW) engines typical of the backbone fleet. Of note, Desheng Fisheries is the same company that owns Yuemaobinyu 42881, 42882, 42883, 42885, and 42886, all spotted moored at Whitsun Reef in March. Indeed, they may be the very same boats (their names having been slightly altered in the years since they were built).

Provincial and municipal governments may be the most valuable sources of all. In November 2020, the Guangdong Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Affairs released information about the province’s Spratly (“NS,” for nansha) fishing license quota for 2021. The document indicated that 255 Guangdong boats would receive Spratly fishing licenses this year, among which 185 would go to backbone boats and 70 would go to “ordinary boats” (普通渔船). The Bureau attached an Excel spreadsheet listing the chosen vessels. The document omitted Table 1, containing the list of backbone boats. But it did include Table 2, listing the 70 “ordinary” fishing boats. Since only two types of Guangdong boats operate in the Spratlys—i.e., ordinary and backbone—any Guangdong boat there and not found in Table 2 must be a backbone bone, and therefore presumed militia.

These data help shed light on recent events. In March and April 2021, the Philippine Coast Guard released photos of Chinese fishing boats loitering at Whitsun Reef. Thanks to the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI), we know the identities of 23 of them.

Both AMTI and the Philippines Coast Guard classified them as “militia.” They are right. All are from Guangdong. All are absent from Table 2. And that makes them no “ordinary” boats./.

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Ryan D. Martinson is a researcher in the China Maritime Studies Institute at the Naval War College. He holds a master’s degree from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and a bachelor’s of science from Union College. Martinson has also studied at Fudan University, the Beijing Language and Culture University, and the Hopkins-Nanjing Center.

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Admiral James Stavridis was 16th Supreme Allied Commander of NATO and 12th Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. He spent the bulk of his operational career in the Pacific, and is author of “2034: A Novel of the Next World War.”

A great deal has been written about the possibility of a war between the U.S. and China. It tends to be measured in theoretical terms, and much of the analysis centers on exactly when it might occur. But the vital question is really quite simple: who would win?

Of course — no one really “wins” a major war. But the best way to avoid having to go to war at all is to convince your potential opponent that they almost certainly would be the biggest loser. The military balance between China and the United States is complicated, and requires thinking about budgets, numbers of warships and aircraft, geography, alliance systems and technology — especially undersea capability, cybersecurity and space.

Let’s start with dollars and yuan. The U.S. defense budget is fairly transparent, at least in terms of total dollars. Defense spending was around $714 billion in the 2020 fiscal year — and is likely to increase to $733 billion in 2021. Somewhat opaque, China’s defense spending is certainly smaller, with this defense budget set at 1.36 trillion yuan ($212.6 billion), a 6.8% increase from the previous year.

But China does not have the high personnel costs of an all-volunteer force, and their military activities are largely focused on East Asia, not the very expensive global footprint of the U.S. military. And a significant level of their spending does not appear “on the public books.” Overall, in terms of resources, the U.S. has an advantage, but it is not as overwhelming as it appears.

In terms of simple numbers of warships, China is already leading the U.S., roughly 350 to 300, in combat vessels. And the Chinese shipyards are pumping out new warships on a near-weekly basis, especially relatively low-technology patrol missile boats, corvettes and frigates. Still, U.S. ships are ton-for-ton larger, endowed with better offensive and defensive systems, and manned by far more experienced crews.

Additionally, the U.S. has a very sophisticated network of command-and-control capabilities to knit together its long-range aviation platforms alongside surface warships and, of course, submarines. When factoring in the tight geography of east Asia, I would say slight advantage China in terms of pure numbers of platforms both sea and air, with the U.S. having higher quality of assets.

Geographically, China enjoys a great advantage in a potential conflict with the U.S. in the South and East China seas. Notably, China would be able to support its warships logistically in terms of fuel and ammunition, provide combat repair facilities nearby and move sailors on and off their ships with ease. For the United States, lengthy supply and manpower chains would bedevil U.S. forces, even allowing for the presence of U.S. bases close by.

Additionally, the string of artificial islands built by China throughout the South China Sea would somewhat balance the U.S. bases in South Korea, Japan and Guam. The U.S. Navy, by the way, does not refer to the roughly 10 Chinese “islands” as artificial islands — rather, they are thought of as unsinkable aircraft carriers.

Indeed, a great deal of U.S. tactical and strategic warfighting thinking is going into how to neutralize those facilities, with one thought being to deploy U.S. Marine special forces — Marine Raiders — to destroy their offensive capability early in a fight. While the U.S. would try to make up for its long logistic tail by engaging our allies, geography is clearly a factor that favors China.

How about alliances? The U.S. has long felt that its greatest comparative advantage over China is its network of allies, partners and friends around the world. In Asia, that means strong support from Japan — the third-largest economy in the world, Australia – very capable naval forces, South Korea, Singapore and many others. The U.S. is also strongly cultivating India via the Quad concept of aligning it with the U.S., Japan and Australia. Yet how much the U.S. could count on such partners in the face of a Chinese attack is a growing question.

Additionally, China is increasingly taking a page from the U.S. and strengthening its systems of partnerships. The Belt and Road Initiative is designed to do exactly that, and the Chinese are making inroads both in Asia and the east coast of Africa. Most importantly, Beijing is consolidating its relationships with Russia — the two nations frequently exercise together militarily, Iran — China just announced a $400 billion investment, Pakistan and the Philippines — President Rodrigo Duterte seems to favor China in many issues over the U.S., nominally a formal treaty ally.

Overall, the U.S. allies are bigger, richer and have stronger militaries, so an advantage for Washington — but the gap is closing.

Finally, and most importantly, victory in a U.S.-China war would be highly influenced by who has the best technology. In the key areas of undersea silencing of submarines, numbers of military satellites in space, offensive and defensive cyber tools and unmanned vehicles, the U.S. still has the lead. But China is closing fast, especially in artificial intelligence, hypersonic cruise missiles, cyber and the emerging field of quantum computing. The recently released National Commission on Artificial Intelligence is telling in this regard. Again, slight — but closing — advantage to the United States.

Bottom line: If I were the admiral commanding the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command — the leader for all American military forces in the Pacific and Indian oceans — I would still want the U.S. hand of cards to play. But as the Duke of Wellington said of the Battle of Waterloo, a fight with China would be a “near-run thing.” And over the next decade, that gap will close and — if the U.S. does not respond — will favor China.

That is why I set my recent novel, 2034: A Novel of the Next World War, 10 to 15 years in the future. Those alarm bells are going off at the Pacific Fleet headquarters in Pearl Harbor, and watch for U.S. strategic focus, resources and advanced technology to head west in the coming decade./.

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