The simulation, which SCMP reports was published last month in the Chinese peer-reviewed Chinese journal Operations Research and Management Science, notes that this logistics network can cover 17 to 80 features in the Spratly and Paracel Islands.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The researchers also noted that \u201cit has become a top priority to build a logistics network that can operate effectively and coordinate various modes of transport,\u201d and \u201cthe construction of these transport facilities has laid very favorable basic conditions for the construction of a logistics network in the South China Sea,\u201d the SCMP report said.<\/p>\n\n\n\n SCMP notes that the most extensive scenario involving 80 features would cost 20 billion yuan (US$2.9 billion) to build new harbors, warehouses and cargo ships and maintain regular flights between China and 20 island airports.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The report also mentioned that this logistics network would enable China to send personnel and equipment to any feature within six hours after a typhoon or other contingency.<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, SCMP notes some challenges emerged in the simulation, including defining variables such as site selection for the central transport hub, wharf construction size and timeframe, types of transport ships and aircraft, plotting transport routes and accounting for differences in cargo capacity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Moreover, SCMP notes that the simulation only accounted for fixed-wing aircraft while an AI that can account for helicopters is still under development.<\/p>\n\n\n\n AI is set to play an outsized strategic role in China\u2019s grand strategy, with corresponding applications in its \u201cgray zone\u201d strategy, which involves coercive actions short of full military conflict.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A May 2021 report by the National Bureau of Asian Research<\/a> notes that AI, alongside other technologies such as algorithms, Big Data analytics and quantum computing, is an enabler for China\u2019s military concepts such as algorithm confrontation, which holds that the side with the data advantage will prevail in a conflict.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In addition, the report notes that China\u2019s future gray zone strategies will likely feature more emerging technologies such as AI and associated data-processing capabilities to enhance maritime intelligence, data collection and surveillance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In a December 2018 Global Risk Insights article<\/a>, Jonathan Hall mentions that AI may be China\u2019s edge over other claimant states and the US in the South China Sea.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Hall says that China has developed a prototype AI-enabled diplomatic system, which is now used to lighten the load for policymakers managing its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), with AI being used to process large amounts of data and provide policy recommendations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Such technology, Hall notes, gives China\u2019s policymakers a huge advantage in the efficiency and accuracy of their judgments and can be applied to other spheres such as the South China Sea disputes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Indeed, China may already be exploiting the advantages afforded by AI in its gray zone strategy for the South China Sea disputes, which blurs the distinction between civilian and military applications of force to achieve political and diplomatic objectives.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Benjamin Noon and Christopher Bassler note\u00a0in a January 2022 article for the Jewish Policy Center\u00a0<\/a>that with AI taking a more significant role in decision-making, China\u2019s strategists think that future warfare will turn into an arms race over who can produce computers with the quickest computing capacity, with wartime commanders having supercomputers surpassing the decision-making capabilities of their operators.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n Noon and Bassler suggest that China\u2019s strategists see future warfare akin to a video game. The operational commander\u2019s state of mind is the decisive point of conflict, emphasizing psychological warfare. Thus, they note, China\u2019s goal is to outsmart the enemy and reduce its will to resist.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Along those lines, Gregory Poling notes\u00a0in a January 2020 article for War on the Rocks<\/a>\u00a0that China\u2019s primary strategy in the South China Sea is not to fight a war with the US, but to use gray zone paramilitary pressure to force Southeast Asian states into abandoning their maritime claims using its island bases, hundreds of militia ships and large fleet of Coast Guard ships.<\/p>\n\n\n\n![\"\"](\"http:\/\/east-sea.de\/datei\/uploads\/2023\/03\/China-South-China-Sea-Fiery-Cross-Reef.webp\")
<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n![\"\"](\"http:\/\/east-sea.de\/datei\/uploads\/2023\/03\/tau-philippines-tau-trung-quoc-16775056449011556172959-1.jpg\")
<\/figure>\n\n\n\n![\"\"](\"http:\/\/east-sea.de\/datei\/uploads\/2023\/03\/militia.webp\")
<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n